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After thirty years of reform and opening up, China’s tax revenue grows rapidly. 
In 2012, the national tax revenue achieves a total of 11.074 trillion yuan, accounting 
for 86% of the fiscal revenue, and more than 19% of GDP. However, contrast to 
China's rapid tax revenue growth, we have not yet completed a comprehensive system 
of tax legislative work. Although the tax system is being improved since the reform 
and opening up, it is undeniable that in our country there are still many problems 
about the tax legislation. Judging from the legislative basis, our optimal tax legislation 
is lack of tax law and tax legalism. Judging from the content of law, the right to tax, 
tax rates, tax rights, tax regulatory and other issues still are not detailed and 
reasonable answered. When the missing theoretical study of the optimal tax 
legislation, especially the right to tax, tax rates and tax regulatory issues are mapped 
to the tax practice, it results in failure to achieve the maximation of social welfare in China's 
taxation on the basis of balance of all parties’ interests. Therefore, following the tax 
legalism, reasonable taxation, scientific tax rate, tax regulatory are the key problems 
to build our optimal tax legislation system. 
This paper takes the theory of New Institutional Economics as analytical 
framework. Based on domestic and foreign literatures , this paper then uses the theory 
of institutional change to discuss the history 、status quo and existing problems of 
China's tax legislation. Then we discuss the fundamental basis and basic problems of 
the tax legislation. The empirical part of the paper uses game theory, dynamic stochastic 
general equilibrium theory and transaction cost theory to study the right to tax, tax rates 
and tax regulatory issues. Finally we propose comments and suggestions to improve our 
optimal tax legislation.There are 7 chapters in this paper as follows: 
Chapter 1: Background. This part tell us about the background that why we 
discuss this topic. Based on it, we review and comment the domestic and foreign 
literatures, then interpret the ideas, methods and framework about this paper. Also the 
















Chapter 2: History, current situation and problems of tax legislation under institutional 
change. It focuses on the history, current situation and shortage about tax legislation. 
The paper also interpret the status quo of the optimal tax legislation from the 
perspective of institutional evolution and analysis its problems.  
Chapter 3: The core basis of the optimal tax legislation and basic questions. It 
comprehensively analyzes tax fairness and tax efficiency under the legal doctrine of the tax, and 
then proposes the basic problems of the optimal tax legislation. 
Chapter 4: Setting of tax right and tax efficiency loss under principal - agent model. It 
focuses on tax rights and inefficiency of tax using the principal - agent model. 
Chapter 5: optimal tax rate set of China's tax legislation under DSGE model. It focuses 
on the choice of the optimal tax rate under the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium 
mode and tries to establish the functional relationship between the tax rate and its influencing 
factors. 
Chapter 6: Transaction cost theory of optimal tax regulation. It focuses on analysis of 
transaction cost theory of tax collection and control review. 
Chapter 7: Conclusion and Policy recommendations. This chapter tells us the 
summary conclusions and policy recommendations. Conclusions are as follows:(1) 
Tax legalism is the fundamental basis of the optimal tax legislation;(2)Optimal tax 
right is determined on screening agents’s real information based on information 
asymmetry;(3) The per capita capital stock is the only endogenous variable that 
determines the optimal tax rate;(4) Transaction costs of tax administration need dual 
governance of internal controls and external law system.The paper also puts forward 
four policy recommendations: (1)Accelerating the building of China's tax legal 
doctrine and tax law;(2)Accelerating the building of the tax information platform to 
improve the transparency of the tax legislation;(3)The optimal tax rate should be 
adjusted by the annual capital stock;(4) Local tax Bureau should be abolished and tax 
work should be directly incorporated into the financial sector. 
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Joel Slemrod & Shlomo Yitzhaki（2000）研究表明当税收结构发生变化时，
人们会改变其消费篮子，但也可能会通过改变交易时间等行为而非直接改变消费
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收结构等 优问题，但没有对 优税收立法的整体性和统一性进行研究⑥。 
1.2.2 国内研究动态 
                                                        
① David M Newbery．Optimal tax rates and tax design during systemic reform[J]．Journal of Public Economics，
1997，63（02）：177–206． 
② Tuomala Matti．Optimal income tax and redistribution[M]．Walton：Clarendon Press，2001． 
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⑥ 我们国内外文献中很少提及 优税收立法的概念可能是出于谨慎角度思考。本文是从动态角度对税收立
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